1 Introduction

"THIRD WORLD"—FIRST IMPRESSIONS

Were you to stand in the center of a village in Africa, Asia, or Latin America—in a so-called "less developed" country—you could watch the daily comings and goings of villagers. Let's say that this is an African village, in the country of Kenya. Soon a man in his late 20s asks a young girl in school uniform to fetch a chair for you, and he invites you to sit in the shade. Depending on whether you know the village well (perhaps even were born there) or are a first-time visitor, you can make mental notes on the material conditions of life and, by talking with passers-by, learn about the hopes, joys, and problems of the people living there. You may see much poverty, but you may also be struck by the richness and vibrancy of the social life around you.

Local conditions seem to explain local life. It is not always apparent that virtually any village is part of a global political economy, a world system. Your first impressions may lead you to ask whether the poverty in the village has stemmed from a complex product of checks, impediments, and constraints—partly of an environmental sort (poor soils, inadequate, unreliable rainfall, endemic diseases), and partly related to sociocultural attitudes and practices that either exhibit adjustments to local environmental circumstances, or are often regarded as "barriers" to technical and attitudinal changes that might lead to greater productivity and well-being.

You are curious about the man who has just asked the girl to bring out a chair for you. Who is he, and what does he do? What does he think of his village and the world? What about the girl? Is she his daughter or niece? Where is the rest of her family? Does her mother work on the farm or sell anything at the market? Is her mother involved in the local nongovernmental organization (NGO) that works on human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) and reproductive health in the village?

But the young man has taken an interest in you and why you are there! He tells you his name, Wambua Muathe, and asks yours. He tells you proudly that he has gone to college. He is not disconnected from the world. Indeed, he appears to be quite knowledgeable about current events, and if you come from the United States he quizzes you about

U.S. foreign policy, much of which puzzles and dismays him. His older sister, Leila, works in the capital city, and he talks with her frequently by cell phone. (You note the Reeboks and Levis that he is wearing.) There is a cybercafé in the nearby market town, and although it is mostly down due to frequent power outages, Wambua has learned how to use the Internet. His uncle, Mwinjuma, has lived for some time in Rochester, Minnesota, and he likes to be in touch with him.

As you visit, you notice that not everyone is dressed like Wambua. Wambua has sent packing a large bunch of curious kids who gathered around you as you sat down. Some young boys in neat school uniforms run by on their way to football (soccer) practice. Some school girls, in uniform as well, run with the boys; others, including Wambua's niece, Ngina, who brought the chair for you, get busy with afternoon chores at home. But you note other youngsters, dressed in worn, torn garments. They appear not to go to school at all; some have herniated, protuberant navels and leg sores, and a few show signs of malnutrition. Some of the girls and boys are taking care of younger siblings. The older women move between outdoor kitchen and the insides of their houses. Some return from a nearby hand pump with buckets and jerri cans filled with water. There is a constant round of activities. In one of the houses, a radio loudly plays "Kwassa Kwassa," a popular number by a Congolese Swahili band named Kanda Bongo Man; farther along from another house you can hear the percussive sound of rap music, something you vaguely recognize as being by 50 Cent. Why are there so few men? Some of them are away working on estates, plantations, or mines; others have jobs in cities, working for one multinational corporation or another. They return home from time to time, and some manage to send money back to help their families. Kavindu, Ngina's mother and Wambua's sister-in-law, calls and asks him to help haul more water, so he excuses himself.

You are forming the impression that there are features of the stereotypical first world that show up in third world settings—popular music, athletic shoes, blue jeans, jobs in multinational corporations, as well as a constant flow of information about happenings elsewhere in the world. You try to compare this poverty with the poverty and limited access to education and health care you have seen in your own country, and you suddenly think of questions you never thought of asking when you were "back home." You realize that all these elements you have been observing are interconnected. The world has been interconnected for a long time—perhaps not so instantaneously as today (with the Internet, transmission of video, audio, and text messages from anywhere to everywhere is possible within nanoseconds), but connected nonetheless.

Most readers of this page, of course, are not standing in a village in Africa (or Asia or Latin America). For many readers (at least those whose immediate experience is limited to western, industrialized societies), their understanding of lives in such places is generally secondhand, vicarious; their knowledge and assumptions about these "other" worlds are anecdotal and unsystematic.

The planes flown into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, on September 11, 2001, provided a spectacular reminder that alienation and poverty elsewhere cannot be explained as simply local events, and that distant consequences can come home to roost. Many Americans reacted to this particular shocking act of terrorism by asking, "Why do they hate us?" They were puzzled that people in distant lands, drawn to Islamic extremism, could be and were willing to engage in "this kind of attack on us," seemingly out of the blue. Can these acts really be explained as coming from a "hatred of freedom" or of what Americans do at home? Too few Americans understood how such acts can be traced to alienating experiences with colonialism and development, stretching back over centuries, and grievances for which the United States as a nation and

U.S.-based corporations were readily identifiable as both symbols and culpable parties (not least because of the United States' historical associations with violence in strategic parts of the third world)—notwithstanding the fact that many victims were themselves not Americans. These acts reinforced tendencies to equate Islam with violent fundamentalism and the Middle East, overlooking how the powerlessness with which many ordinary people experience globalization has catalyzed a turn to (often xenophobic) extremisms—Christian, Jewish, Hindu, and Muslim—also in North America and South Asia.

In the post-9/11 world, it is especially important that we become more systematically informed about the meanings and processes pertaining to development and underdevelopment in the third world. We hope this book will help. We use geographical and historical methods of analysis to explore the nature and structure of relations in what is becoming more and more each day a "globalized" world. It should already be clear that "first world" and "third world" are not monolithic categories. We must constantly question and problematize these labels, even as we grapple with why and how to understand the complexity of lives and struggles in the third world. To borrow a phrase from a colleague, Yi-Fu Tuan, our goal is to increase the "burden of awareness" of our readers (see sidebar: "Understanding Poverty?").

TRANSCENDING ENLIGHTENMENT IN A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE

A cultural theory which stresses the hybridities and impurities that are the legacy of colonialism and global capitalism and which recognizes the continuously transforming impact of global inequalities on the lives of the marginal people in the Third World can better account both for the conditions in which claims to indigenousness are politically effective and for those situations which do not allow for such claims to be mustered . . . "indigenous knowledge" is not a static or

closed system but is itself heterogeneous, hierarchical, and infused by relations of power and inequality; . . . the effectiveness of "indigenous" identity depends on its *recognition* by hegemonic discourses of imperialist nostalgia, where poor and marginal people are romanticized at the same time that their way of life is destroyed . . .
—AKHIL GUPTA (1998:18)

So far, you have been reading references to "poverty" in conjunction with a world that we are painting as being different from the "first world"—a world that we call the "third world." But how do we know poverty when we see it? Is it something we can touch, measure, evaluate, and fix? Lest we assume that definitions of "poor" and "poverty" are universally shared or as old as language itself, it is critical to remind ourselves that poverty is sociopolitically constructed (see sidebar: "The TV Set in the Mud Hut") in much the same way that the idea of the third world is (see Chapter 2). However, the constructed nature of these ideas does not minimize the magnitude of their lived meanings, or the effects of the dichotomies that they implicitly or explicitly invoke (e.g., "underdeveloped" vs. "(over)developed," "backward" vs. "modern," "have-nots" vs. "haves"). All of these have become a critical part of our everyday lives and cultures—who we are, what we are becoming, what we want to become, and how.

We have often learned to see development as diffusing the benefits of modernity to those who have not yet received them. However, this view is complicated by the rise of postmodernist thinking, which arose to contest modernist pretensions. Therefore, some might see our inquiry into poverty and development as indicative of a titanic struggle between two contrasting visions of the world. One is generally regarded as linear and progressive, originating in the European Enlightenment; the other, a "Counter-Enlightenment" vision (to use Isaiah Berlin's term), tends to be circular, ecological, and decentralizing, standing in reaction to the

Understanding Poverty?

One of our most remarkable capacities as humans is our ability to live with contradictions. Those of us living in comfortable circumstances know that a world of poverty and inequality exists, and we know that the values in which we are instructed from childhood in our homes, schools, and places of worship argue for greater equity and for the worth and dignity of human life. Yet thoughts about inequality do not dominate our waking moments, and certainly not our actions. There is much else to life. For most U.S. residents, as for many wealthy people across the globe, the world's poverty and its problems are remote. The Czech novelist Franz Kafka (1948: 418) wrote in his diary for August 1914: "Germany has declared war against Russia. Afternoon, swimming pool." The world's problems are felt to be too large and complex to be assumed as an individual burden. Yet Robert Heilbroner, in *The Great Ascent* (1963), attempted to present a vivid tableau of underdevelopment by describing his view of what it would take to transform a typical U.S. family into an equally typical family of the underdeveloped world. He argued that the transformation could be described in terms of a string of subtractions, removing material and nonmaterial things from the family. First, almost all of the furniture, clothing, and food would be taken away, and then the house itself (a nearby shed would have to suffice). This would be followed by communications—gone would be TV, telephone, newspapers, and books, as well as the family's literacy itself. One radio would remain for the neighborhood. This would be followed by the removal of services—schools, health clinics, doctors, police, and fire services. Thus, saying an individual lives on less than $2 per day shows what it would take to convert a typical U.S. family into one living in third world poverty. This view, despite its gendered and racialized oversimplifications, vividly illustrates the material dimensions of privilege and deprivation that characterize the global politics of development.

excesses and destructive tendencies of the first vision (Berlin, 1979). The Enlightenment project is viewed by its proponents as a positive, progressive movement, whose ultimate goal is the liberation of humankind from poverty and oppression. Its keywords are "progress," "simplicity," "universalism," and "rationality." The Enlightenment began with such philosophers as John Locke and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz in the 17th century, so it has had over 300 years to work toward its objectives. It cannot be said that it has made much headway in a large part of the world, and indeed Counter-Enlightenment scholars question whether it can or should.

The goals of the Counter-Enlightenment are similar to those of the Enlightenment—the liberation of humankind from poverty and oppression—but its strategy is different. First, it is critical of the excessively reductionist ways of knowing and essentialist thinking that the Enlightenment brought. Stemming from that, it exhibits a deep suspicion of western instrumentalities: capital-ism and market-driven economics; advanced technologies and the sciences; the central power of the state. It is also critical of the way capitalism, technology, and the state have combined to use up the earth's natural resources and degrade the environment, all the while (through a global reach of advertising, marketing, trade, and communications) seeking to transform the wants and desires of third world peoples by projecting first world products and ideals onto them. The Counter-Enlightenment's proponents point to the grotesque, wasteful, irrational consumption of resources in the first world, while millions in the third world live in misery and poverty. Instead, for first and third world people alike, the Counter-Enlightenment celebrates diversity; localism and community; egalitarianism; ecological sustainability, a small scale, and self-sufficiency; and pride in local culture, ethnicity, and traditions. It seeks to do away with structures that support and protect the powerful—for example, classism, patriarchy, sexism, homophobia, and racism—and to achieve a world in which

The TV Set in the Mud Hut

How do we know "poverty" when we see it? Majid Rahnema (1992: 158–159) argues that poverty is historically, politically, and geographically constructed:

> For long and in many cultures of the world, poor was not always the opposite of rich. Other considerations such as falling from one's station in life, being deprived of one's instruments of labor, the loss of one's status or the marks of one's profession (for a cleric, the loss of his books; for a noble, the loss of his horse or arms), lack of protection, exclusion from one's community, abandonment, infirmity, or public humiliation defined the poor. The Tswana people of South Africa recognized their poor by their reactions to the appearance of locusts. Whereas the rich people were appalled lest the locusts ate the grass needed by their cattle, the poor who had no cattle rejoiced because they could themselves eat the locusts.
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> In Europe, for ages, the pauper was opposed to the *potens* (the powerful), rather than the rich. In the 9th century, the pauper was considered a free man whose freedom was imperiled only by the *potentes*. In the . . . 11th century, . . . the word, poor, could be applied to the owner of a little alleu (a tax-free property), a wandering merchant, and even to any non-fighter, including the unescorted wives of knights. On the whole, the poor were quite respectable persons who had only lost, or stood in the danger of losing, their "berth."
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> In that same period in Europe, a whole new category of poor appeared on the social stage—the voluntary poor who chose to share the life of the destitute and the berthless. For these, living poorly was a sign of elevation rather than degradation. Respect and admiration for the voluntary poor had, of course, always existed in Eastern traditions.
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> It was only after the expansion of the mercantile economy, the processes of urbanization leading to massive pauperization and, indeed, the monetization of society that the poor were defined as lacking what the rich could have in terms of money and possessions.
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> A common denominator for most perceptions of poverty remains the notion of "lack" or "deficiency." The notion reflects only the basic relativity of the concept, for a utopian "complete" man would not be lacking anything. Besides, when poor is defined as lacking a number of things necessary to life, the questions could be asked: What is necessary and for whom? And who is qualified to define all that? In smaller communities, where people are less strangers to one another and things are easier to compare, such questions are already difficult to answer. In a world of the mass media, the old familiar horizons and communally defined bases of comparison are all destroyed. Everyone may think of themselves as poor when it is the TV set in the mud hut which defines the necessities of life, often in terms of the wildest and fanciest consumers appearing on the screen.

people enjoy freedom, equality, community, and material well-being.

If we accept the idea of a great dialectical contest between the forces of modernity and the forces arrayed in opposition to it, one way to make sense of these contrasting logics is in terms of what Tuan (1996) views as a struggle between cosmos and hearth. "Cosmos" refers to the high-modern Enlightenment project based on what are presumed to be universal forms of reason, science, the application of technology, and democracy. "Hearth" represents a postmodern radical reaction to Enlightenment modernization. The Counter-Enlightenment, which seeks to recover the time-honored virtues and blessings of the hearth, features deconstruction of modernity's hegemonic megastructures—philosophical, sociopolitical, historical, literary, and scientific (Giddens, 1991: 27 ff.). In Tuan's provocative image, the playing field among cultures is leveled by deconstructing the megastructures of "high culture," so that they are reduced in size to those of the "miniworks of preliterate peoples, folks, peasant immigrants, ethnics"; "we are then

left with differences between one opinion, one work, and another, all spread out as it were on a flat plane, a colorful mosaic of sharply bounded, incommensurate units, rather than ranked judgments of ideas and works, a topography of peaks, plains and troughs" (Tuan, 1996: 128).

Another way to work through this tension is by confronting the myth of development which, despite repeated failures, continues to be justified on the grounds that the failures are caused by local, regional, or national problems, not by the logic of development itself. For Latouche (1993), development and underdevelopment are part of an asymmetrical world system, but culture exists as prior to and alongside economic domination. The idea of development is fundamentally a western cultural invention that has been poorly grafted in the third world, while the perception of what is underdeveloped is a result of the collision of different cultural universes—western and nonwestern. This perspective recognizes that the desire for development exists in the third world, but it questions whether development and opulence will have long-term viability for the west (or anywhere else), given the extensive environmental destruction and the level of human alienation that it has caused. To transcend the development narrative, Latouche and others conceive of a postwestern world arising out of the nebula of informal economy and alternative social relations: "While modern society is seen as detaching the economic from the social, the informal society is regarded as embedding the economic with the social by reactivating networks of solidarity and reciprocity" (Saunders, 2002a: 22).

The notion of contestations over the diffusion of modernity may not be the most useful way to think about development. The distinction between what is or is not modern is murky. Latour argues in the title of his 1993 book that *We Have Never Been Modern*, and Gidwani (2002) argues for the notion of multiple and context-specific modernities. To frame the problem in terms of Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment, cosmos and hearth, or modern and informal runs the grave risk of reifying the artificial dichotomy between the west and the rest, while overlooking the unexpected intersections among the globe-spanning legacies of the modernist projects of colonialism, nationalism, and development—intersections that are regarded as the defining features of the "postcolonial condition." Engaging with these intersections, as Gupta (1998: 20) points out, requires us to grapple with hybrid discourses and practices, to delineate the intertwining of "local" practices with global and national projects of development, and to unsettle the binaries of colonial and nationalist thought by pointing to the imbrication of the indigenous in modernist discourse. Rather than determining whether something is authentic, original, or uncontaminated, we must accept cultural hybridity as a starting point in political projects that seek to empower subaltern, poor, and marginal groups. At the same time, Gupta (1998: 24) is careful to remind us that "the postcolonial" cannot be a synonym for "the third world." Since postcolonial theory is profoundly shaped by the failure to constitute a modern nation that mimics the development trajectory of the "west," it has much less influence in locations or with groups that have had a longer period of formal independence (e.g., parts of Latin America); among people who are still colonized (e.g., native and aboriginal peoples of North America and Australia); and in places where the optimism of nationhood has not yet yielded to the disillusion of postcoloniality (e.g., South Africa).

The diverse trajectories of decolonization make it important that any attempt to understand the postcolonial dilemma attends analytically to these similarities and differences:

> On the one hand, it is important to see modernity, colonialism, capitalism, development discourse, and international science as *global* phenomena that have far reaching and systematic consequences for the regions that they

affect. On the other hand, it is crucial not to overlook the differences in the forms taken by these global phenomena in multiple locations, differences that arise from contestation, reworking, and rearticulation. The opposition between "the global" and "the local" itself depends on a spatialized dichotomy that needs to be questioned. (Gupta, 1998: 24)

CULTURES AND REPRESENTATIONAL ASYMMETRIES

"Culture is who we are and who we are becoming." It is the food we put on the table; the way we cook it; the utensils with which we eat it; the relations between the people who sit at the table and the people who cook and serve; what is done with the leftovers; what is discussed during the meal; what music, dancing, poetry, or theater accompany it; and the social and spiritual values of those present—for, when we say culture, we include the visions, dreams, and aspirations of humanity.

How is it possible to talk of social and economic development without talking about culture? . . . How can we address the question of literacy if we ignore the question of what there is to read? Do we want women to learn to read and write merely so that they can follow the instructions in packages of birth control pills? Or do we want them to be able to read their own lives, write their own destinies, and claim their share?
—MEREDITH TAX with MARJORIE AGOSIN,
AMA ATA AIDOO, RITU MENON,
NINOTCHKA ROSCA, and MARIELLA SALA
(1999: 113)

The processes and politics of development are inextricably intertwined with the manner in which "cultures" are invoked, defined, and evaluated—often in terms of "backward" or "progressive," "traditional" or "modern," "dynamic" or "static." Our aim in this book is not to define, explain, or assess cultures. Indeed, we agree with Appadurai (1996) that culture should be approached not as a noun, but as an adjective, "cultural"—culture not as substance, but as the dimension-

ality of difference. He sees things cultural as "situated difference, that is, difference in relation to something local, embodied, and significant" (Appadurai, 1996: 12). But a commitment to approach the cultural as situated difference brings with itself enormous responsibilities and challenges: How and from which locations can we speak about, write, and represent that which is different and thereby becomes our "other," and for what purposes? These challenges are strikingly similar to the ones that Ella Shohat (1998: 8–9) describes in her elaboration of feminist alliance work that shuttles "back and forth between concentric circles of affiliation riven by power asymmetries." For Shohat,

The critique of white feminists who speak for all women might be extrapolated to cases in which upper-middle class "Third World" women come to unilaterally represent "other" working class sisters, or to [cases in which] diasporic feminists [operate] within First World representational practices. Metropolitan feminists of color have to be aware of these hierarchies, just as "Third World" feminists cannot ignore class or religious privileges when "speaking for our sisters." The possibility of speaking for Third World sisters (even if of the same color) is rooted in global structural inequalities that generate such representational asymmetries, whereby some voices and some modes of speaking are amplified more than others. . . . Even with the very best intentions, a fetishized focus on African female genital mutilation or on Asian foot-binding ends up as complicit with a Eurocentric victimology that reduces African or Asian cultures and women to such practices, while muting or marginalizing African or Asian agency and organizing. A multicultural feminist critique disrupts the narrative of center/periphery when talking "about" the "Third World," showing feminist resistant practices within a conflictual community, where opposition to such practices does not perpetuate the false dichotomy of savagery versus civilization or tradition versus modernity. . . . [It is] less concerned with identities as something one has than in identification as something one does. While rejecting fixed, essentialist and reductionist formulations of identity, it

fosters a mutually enriching politics of inter-community representation.

To internalize Shohat's concerns and apply them—even minimally—to our own project, we must struggle with the challenge of rejecting fixed, essentialized, and reductionist formulations of the third world, while highlighting the processes by which the dynamic specificities of communities and lives in the third world are erased, are homogenized, are retained, or become points of contestation in development thought and practice. This task, of course, is more easily summarized than enacted, and must become part of a lifelong journey dedicated to learning how to become responsible teachers and students of difference.

As a starting point, we can think of two ways to embark on this journey in U.S. academic spaces. First, we can make a conscious attempt to disrupt any borders or boundaries that seek to make a stark separation between the "there" of a backward, oppressed, traditional third world on the one hand, and the "here" of a progressive, emancipated, modern first world on the other (see sidebar: "Shoes, Veils, and Murders"). Second, we must mark moments of tension and contradictions in our own generalizations about the third world, and be critically reflexive of the possibilities and limitations that such generalizations enable.

Tropicality: The More-than-Human World

One such generalization, popular again, is that nature (not culture) is what makes the third world different from the first. In particular, the generalization is made that the third world is tropical, and that tropical environments stand in the way of development (e.g., Diamond, 1997; Sachs, Mellinger, and Gallup, 2001). Many parts of the global south are not tropical (Chapter 2), but the persistence of poverty and malnutrition in sub-Saharan Africa continues to invite this environmental explanation. The dan-

ger, again, is slippage into a mode of thinking that separates a tropical "there" from a temperate "here." We seek to take the more-than-human world seriously, while contesting such thinking.

We examine particularities of tropical environments in Chapters 8–12. Locations close to the equator do indeed experience particular temperature and rainfall regimes and soil conditions, and particular disease clusters. Yet the claim that tropicality prevents development is based on the presumption that the nonhuman world can be thought of as separate from and determinant of human livelihood possibilities. In fact, society and environment are mutually constitutive (Chapter 7). Thus the continued presence of distinct, hazardous disease clusters in tropical environments is not simply caused by the tropics. To take the perspective of western medicine, their persistence is due to the lack of effort devoted to finding preventative measures or cures for diseases in these impoverished parts of the world. For example, the persistence of malaria in tropical Africa and its absence from the southern United States is not because of climatic differences, but because of historical efforts in the United States to eliminate the environmental conditions favoring anophelene mosquitoes, as well as the mosquitoes themselves. (When analysts attribute the prevalence of HIV/AIDS to tropicality, simply because of its presence across sub-Saharan Africa, it is a prime example of such muddle-headed thinking. HIV is spread through human-to-human contact, not through biophysical processes.)

Another important shaper of livelihood possibilities is agriculture. Tropical environments do pose particular challenges, but it does not follow that climate is the principal cause of the livelihood challenges faced by tropical agriculturalists. Under colonialism, some indigenous farmers were displaced from those environments best suited to rapid crop growth, which were given to European farmers; others were required to grow export crops to sell to uncertain markets,

Shoes, Veils, and Murders

The work of shuttling back and forth, of disrupting stereotypes, of pushing ourselves to be critical of the ways in which "we" ourselves are oppressed (even as we are eager to identify the "other" as victim, and to help emancipate that victim) is hard intellectual, political, and emotional labor. However, there are many examples in feminist work where such labor has been creatively undertaken. Uma Narayan (1997), a U.S.-based feminist scholar, contrasts popular representations of murders by "dowry deaths" in India with those by domestic violence in the United States. Nawal El Saadawi (1994), an Egyptian feminist writer and activist, has similarly compared the oppressions inflicted by two kinds of veils: that covering a woman's head and body (*hijaab, burqa*) and that covering her face (makeup). She argues that these are two sides of the same patriarchal coin that objectifies women's bodies to suit its ends, and it should be added that both are equally complex in how, why, and when they are embraced by women in specific locations and contexts. A third example of such comparisons, which pushes the "self" to insert itself in its reading of the "other," comes from an exhibit at the University of British Columbia's Museum of Anthropology. The exhibit displayed two cultural artifacts commonly described as "shoes." A silk shoe from late-19th-century China, invoked in the west as symbolic of Chinese women's bound feet, was imaginatively paired with a high-heeled shoe from 1990s North America. Presented with a commentary by Anna Nobile (1999; provided courtesy of James F. Glassman, January 4, 2000), the display sought to mark specific continuities across times and cultures:

. . . thought to be erotic . . .
Shoes, China, late 19th century
Artist unknown
Silk

The practice of foot binding began in China during the Song Dynasty (960–1270 AD). Girls, beginning at seven or eight years old, had their feet tightly wrapped and bent until the arch broke and the toes were permanently bent under. The practice was extremely painful and limited the mobility and agility of bound-foot women for centuries. Initially, the practice was limited to the upper classes, but because bound feet were associated with wealth and status, they soon became an essential prerequisite to any advantageous marriage. Small feet in women were thought to be erotic and became euphemistically known as "golden lotuses." The practice lasted into the early twentieth century.

Shoes, North America, 1998
Leather

Today, we still have the high-heeled shoe. In many societies, the female foot is still considered erotic and the high-heeled shoe has become a fetish object. High heels force the buttocks and breasts out while decreasing a woman's mobility and agility. They also compress the toes (leading to calluses and corns), put double the weight on the ball of the foot (leading to bunions and neuromas), strain the tendons around the knees and prolong the pressure across the knee joints and on the back. The practice of wearing high-heeled shoes is prevalent among all social classes throughout the world.
. . . Despite our cultural and racial differences, we are often very much the same.

and/or were encouraged to use technologies that proved inappropriate to their particular social and environmental conditions. From the point of view of western agricultural know-how, after colonialism less effort has been devoted to improving the yields of tropical food crops than to increasing those at home in temperate climates. Beyond this, the global agribusiness economy, along with subsidies to farmers in the United States, Europe, and Japan, have done more to undermine the profitability of agriculture

in the global south than any environmental constraints have.

Nevertheless, environmental conditions make a difference. Although local residents have developed effective means of managing these (Chapter 12), plants grow more slowly in the warm, humid lowland tropics than in the middle latitudes, and soils are often more fragile (Chapters 10 and 11). Such environments favor agricultural and societal practices that are oriented toward subsistence, rather than toward maximizing agricultural surplus as a basis for economic and population growth. If we think in terms of western, growth-oriented cultural and economic systems as being the only way to the good life, such conditions and livelihoods seem disadvantageous. But this, again, is to equate such systems with "modern" and tropical subsistence livelihoods with "backward." In fact, as we begin to realize how much our growth-oriented culture is transforming the nonhuman world through global warming and resource exhaustion, we would be well advised to jettison such hierarchical thinking. What we can learn from such tropical subsistence-oriented livelihoods that can help us learn how to live better?

AFFECT HUNGER AND THE ORIGINS OF CULTURE

For some time now, you have been reading what we have written. What enables you to do this? Your ability is the result of a long learning process that began at birth. Elsewhere in this book, you will encounter discussions of "Orientalism" and the "other." We have a lot to say about the problems of prejudice and stereotyping that western observers frequently exhibit regarding nonwestern cultures—sweeping overgeneralizations that pit "them" against "us."

At the same time, it might be important to consider the perspective that emphasizes the fundamental importance of the "other" in human development and the creation and transmission of culture. Our first "other"

had an "m" in front of it! Everything we know and think stems in some way from an interaction with an "other." Thus is the individual body (the self) brought into the community. Thus does the individual come to know and understand the society and culture of which she or he is a part. These interactive processes and relationships through which we as humans are constantly living and becoming with our "others" are referred to by anthropologist Walter Goldschmidt (2006) as "affect hunger" (see sidebars: "Goldschmidt on Affect Hunger" and "Calculating Kinship").

Our human evolution is now guided by social and cultural factors as well as biological factors. Although affect hunger is expressed in myriad ways in different cultures, it is a fundamental underlying impulse in individual growth and, by extension, in societal and cultural change. As we consider the distortions, deprivations, inequalities, violence, and injustices that individuals, particularly children, experience as they grow up (not only in the third world, but in much of the rest of the world), we can wonder at the long-term effects of losses—the decreases in family cohesion; the diminished sense of place and neighborhood; the disappearance of lodges and clubs; the impoverishment of social and religious networks; the deskilling of labor; impersonal, alienating market and bureaucratic transactions; and loneliness and isolation among the elderly. Affect hunger will find ways to satisfy its cravings, and some of those ways can jeopardize the very cultures in which they emerge—for example, urban gangs in Los Angeles neighborhoods where family structure has broken down and children are left to their own devices. A gang provides a young person with support, identity, security, and a sense of belonging, however antisocial the gang's actions may be deemed by the "other."

The concept of affect hunger serves to remind us that all human beings of every culture seek recognition and expressions of affection from others. Every society has institutions and practices that provide for

and validate an individual's efforts to belong and be valued. We are inherently social beings with social needs. Modern capitalist society, in which impersonal market relations and bureaucratic transactions crowd out genuinely human interactions, can limit the scope for healthy social interchange and can lead to alienation and antisocial behavior. As neoliberal globalization increases its penetration of lives among third world people, compromising or destroying aspects of society that provide value and recognition to individuals, we should keep in mind that affect hunger does not cease; an individual's needs for support and validation will still be met, one way or another.

REWRITING *A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE*

A Microsoft Thesaurus search on the word "collaboration" yields the following results: "teamwork," "partnership," "group effort," "alliance," "relationship," "cooperation." The objectives of teamwork are by definition "shared," but the complex process by which each partnership or alliance arrives at its shared goals makes every collaboration unique. This uniqueness emanates from the manner in which the collaborators negotiate their positionalities (their geographical, sociopolitical, and institutional locations), investments, individual goals (personal, political, intellectual, etc.), and processes for creating a set of common strategies and an agenda that they wish to pursue. Such complex processes of negotiation in an academic collaboration, when specified and analyzed (however partially), can provide useful insights into how we become learners, users, evaluators, and producers of knowledges. Here we want to touch briefly on some of these aspects in the making of the second edition of *A World of Difference*. Our aim is not to achieve perfect transparency before our readers in terms of who we are, how we met, or why we jointly undertook this project. Rather, we want to reflect on some

of the ways in which the present collaboration among four authors (Sheppard, Porter, Faust, and Nagar) makes this book significantly different in nature and scope from the first edition (Porter and Sheppard, 1998).

To begin with, this new edition makes a conscious effort to move away from the dualism of Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment by engaging more systematically with development theory that has deployed a range of poststructuralist and feminist perspectives. The initial five chapters of the book, in particular, attempt to provide a historically specific account of how the third world gets constructed as a "knowable" entity and evolves as such, through colonial encounters, state-led development, and neoliberal globalization.

Relatedly, whereas the book's engagement with feminisms was primarily confined to a chapter section on gender and development (GAD) in the first edition, the second edition actively incorporates insights from feminist approaches to development and difference. Rather than averaging out "feminist approaches" in a broader philosophical discussion about development, we consider feminisms as internally varied and diverse in terms of intellectual stances and political goals. We also note the ways in which the language of feminism itself has been mainstreamed in development rhetoric and practice, with mixed results.

Third, we are more attentive to the theme of contestation at a number of levels. For example, we explore how narratives of empowerment or violence (as in "female literacy," "reduced fertility," and "genital mutilation") are multilayered, and how "emancipation" might carry very different meanings for different groups. We also examine the ways in which contestations around nature, resources, development, and globalization are articulated at multiple scales, sometimes in dissonance and at other times in harmony with one another.

But the process of interrogating a preexisting narrative, revising it by inserting contestation and disharmony into it,

Goldschmidt on Affect Hunger

The cover of Goldschmidt's *The Bridge to Humanity: How Affect Hunger Trumps the Selfish Gene* (2006) has a hauntingly evocative portrait by Pablo Picasso (an early, representational work) of a mother nursing her baby. This image intrudes constantly as one reads the book, whose essential argument is that with the invention of culture, the *social* (affect hunger) assumed priority over the *biological* (genetics) in human evolution. "Affect hunger is the urge to get expressions of affection from others" (Goldschmidt, 2006: 47). This sidebar summarizes Goldschmidt's argument by tracing the steps whereby hominids reached the point of having culture. (All page numbers in what follows are from Goldschmidt, 2006.)

For evolution to occur, two things are necessary. Put most succinctly, they are death and the taking of life. "Change comes only as new generations acquire new traits that render the old obsolete" (ix). "Understanding that others must have died for us to live and the inevitability that we must, in turn, die that others may live reinforces the sense of our continuity with eternity" (ix). Furthermore, "we must all eat to live, must take life to have life. In no other way could the earth support a continuing population—an integral part of the evolutionary process" (ix). Another central fact concerns "mutuality"—the facts that mammalians of all sorts cooperate, and that nurturance is deeply embedded in mammalian behavior (ix).

"The basic lifestyle of each species is always inherited, but the degree and nature of this adaptability vary widely among living things, and this *variability is itself a genetic heritage*" (1; emphasis in original). "Homo sapiens is by far the most adaptable of all species" (1).

Fundamental human behavioral characteristics that enable people to live nearly everywhere on earth are (1) the ability to control internal body temperature; (2) the complex of features involved in viviparous birth (uterine feeding, mammary feeding, and the long dependency period of the infant that requires bonding between infant and parents); and (3) sociability—that is, mutuality and cooperation, which, along with competition, characterize human social life (13–14). Learning is key to all three. "Culture is, by definition, learned behavior, making learning crucial to the human condition" (16–17). A syllogism summarizes the point of the foregoing: "Many genetic instructions that make us human are indeterminate, requiring fine adjustments. These adjustments are responses to situational conditions. The actions of other humans create some situational conditions. Therefore, social and biological cannot be separate realms" (19).

Goldschmidt advances the argument that language and tool making exhibit similarities in logic and structure, and thus must have evolved at the same time. This puts language development much earlier in the development of *Homo sapiens*. Trading quadrupedal for bipedal locomotion and a large head (containing a large brain) for fighting effectiveness (prothaganous jaw, large canines, and an acute sense of smell) made possible "the two things that distinguish Homo sapiens from other forms of life: talking and making things" (21). "The mental processes involved in speaking and in making things are essentially alike" (21). Speech involves (1) the articulation of delicately nuanced sounds (sounds); (2) the formulation of conceptual categories (words and categories); and (3) structuring the relations among the elements brought together in utterances (grammar). In this, humans are truly unique. Summarizing Noam Chomsky, Goldschmidt writes that "humans are endowed with some special mental capacity for learning [the rules of syntax] through experiencing their use by those around them" (24). A human who does not hear human speech by puberty is forever incapable of learning grammar.

A mother cat vigorously licks and grooms her kittens. In so doing, she promotes the "normal growth of dentrites and a full complement of synapses on [the kitten's] nerve cells" (47); that is, the stimulation helps the brain develop. Infants deprived of such "tactile stimulation" do not develop normally. One is reminded of Victor, the "the wild boy of Aveyron." He was found in a wooded part of the southern Massif Central in France, in 1799. He had somehow lived much of his first 12 years separate from human society. Although his mentor, Jean Marc Gaspard Itard, worked unceasingly to educate the young man, Victor never developed human capabilities. He died aged about 40 (Itard, 1801/1962).

"Affect hunger can only be gratified by others; it is therefore immediately implicated in the existence and nature of social relations. It is ratified in many different specific ways, but there are two general ways to meet this need: belonging, and performance. Belonging involves a sense of oneness with others in the environment.

. . . Performance means ability and proficiency in doing things that the individual feels is worthwhile" (58). "The result [of teaching] is to transform the neonate into a responsible and competent member of his or her society. In the long, intimate affective 'conversations' that take place between infant and caretaker, the child gradually acquires the subtle qualities of character and behavior of that culture by learning what evokes the affective responses it is seeking and what wards off painful rejections" (61–62).

Kinship terms are not about persons per se, but about relationships. "Every infant in tribal societies grows up in immediate contact with his mother, father, siblings, and kinship systems expand the dyadic relationships of this domestic ménage outward into the community to engulf everyone, extrapolating the experiences of infancy to the ever-widening relationships in the community" (110). (See sidebar: "Calculating Kinship.") "Kinship systems extend the feelings laid down in the bosom of the family, building on the experiences each member of the family had at the outset of his life" (111). "We apparently have an inherent capacity for bonding, creating an emotional tonus between the neonate and his immediate social environment that gets attached to the words as well as the human referent, extending the expected sentiments to all belonging to that category" (111). "The evolutionary advantage of affect hunger lay in its ability to induce the individual to be committed to the community—to be a socially responsible person. But it did this by giving humans an internal *physiological need*" (119; emphasis in original).

"It is the nurturant love, and the affect hunger that energizes it, that induces us to live in concert with others, to collaborate in creating and maintaining social order, and to inspire us to a creativity that has constantly raised our sights to build ever more elaborate edifices—social and physical" (138).

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and negotiating these changes among four people—two of whom authored the first edition—was bound to be marked by tensions reflecting the varying positionalities of individual authors. Philip W. Porter (PWP) and Eric Sheppard (ES) entered the academy during the development decades (Chapter 4), albeit 15 years apart. PWP's views were shaped by decades of fieldwork among farmers and pastoralists in East Africa, whereas ES brought a much more macro-level political economy and regional comparative perspective. Richa Nagar (RN) and David R. Faust (DRF) studied with PWP and ES, cutting their teeth on feminism and post-development theory (Chapter 5), informed by fieldwork and a range of other complex long-term relationships in India and Tanzania. Bringing these perspectives and commitments to the collaboration strengthened the book—not as a new synthetic statement integrating all views, but by broadening, complicating, and sometimes maintaining the tensions among ourselves, even as we created a narrative to represent different views in the volume.

Among the tensions that became sources of productive dialogue among us, four have been central. One was the question of the specific languages that each of us was used to (words, theories, figures, maps, graphs), due to our subdisciplinary and interdisciplinary trainings, locations, and intellectual investments. A second had to do with our different approaches to questions of literacy and empowerment. Yet another challenge had to do with working through the tension between what can and ought to be generalized, and what must be specified as contingent and as historically and geographically located. Finally, there was the challenge of how to speak or write about the making and unmaking of "other worlds" without thereby "othering" the people, places, and cultures of that world.

Not all of these tensions could be resolved. In fact, rather than pretending that we could arrive at resolution through careful rewriting or editorial work, we want to recognize some characteristics that make our collaboration (and hence this book) different from several other critical texts on the politics of development and global political economy. To begin with, we strive to main-

Calculating Kinship

The concept of "family" in Africa may be so broad that it encompasses an entire community and involves unrelated individuals. The notion of "family" or "household" is relaxed, flexible, hospitable, and open. Every adult woman is a mother or aunt. A child in trouble is the responsibility of anyone, man or woman. Westerners are frequently surprised at the degree to which kinship is claimed and traced over great "distances." Once I (PWP) showed a poem by Rebeka Njau, a Kenyan poet, to Njeri Wang'ati, a Kenyan student who lived with my family for several years in the late 1980s in Minneapolis while attending the University of Minnesota. "Oh! That's my auntie," she exclaimed. I asked her to explain the relationship. "She's my grandmother's stepsister's son-in-law's sister," she said, without a pause to think. Stated another way, her dad's grandfather had a second wife whose granddaughter married Rebeka Njau's brother. It requires seven steps and four generations to link Njeri to Rebeka Njau (see the accompanying figure). I had to ask her to diagram it for me on an envelope, and you probably would too. For her, the links were already "wired" in her mind—established, instantaneously known, and readily explained.

tain substantial depth in areas ranging from development theory to human–environment interactions and industrialization in the global south. In so doing, we engage with a broad set of interconnected processes, but we do not always impose a sense of flow, interconnection, or sequential development in coverage of all topics. Our desire to resist such imposition of sequence or flow emanates, in part, from the presence of theoretical/political dissonances and disjunctures that reflect our own difficult dialogues on the issues we cover in this book.

Thus, even as our framing of this new edition of *A World of Difference* is critical of north–south dualisms, colonial spatial imaginaries, and the colonial gaze, we sometimes use empirical data or sidebars that can be seen as reinforcing such dualisms and imaginaries. At other times, two different chapters, two sections of the same chapter, or two sidebars may highlight competing arguments or approaches in the text. Far

from regarding this as a flaw or limitation of our collaboration, we find this an exciting opportunity for you, our readers, in two specific ways. First, we invite you to juxtapose and read the empirical material in the latter half of the book with and against the theoretical debates raised in the introductory chapters. Second, we invite you to identify how the various disjunctures in this book allow for complicating the concept of difference by interweaving the focus on difference with a focus on knowledge. The two concepts are interrelated: Material differentiation is realized through different knowledges, which in turn both reproduce and justify material differences. We hope that, in its entirety, this book will allow you to gain not only a comprehensive understanding of the world in which you live, but also a scholarly appreciation of the ways in which our world of difference is reproduced through different knowledges and relations to power that undergird those knowledges.

BODY, COMMUNITY, GLOBE: FRAMING A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE

The idea that "the local is global" or that "we all live in a global village" has become a commonly shared wisdom, thanks to Levis and Reeboks as well as to the NGOs, the UN conferences, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) projects that have done their share to popularize these truths. We know that the lives of Wambua Muathe and his neighbors are shaped by the negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO); the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank; the rural development programs adopted by the state; and the activities of Dole, Coca-Cola, ExxonMobil, the International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), and Google. But other truths—that the global is also local; or that, for those largely excluded from the "global village," the global might still be defined by two villages and a nearby town (Sangtin Writers, 2006)—seem to find little space in popular understandings about the global and the local. Indeed, much of the talk about globalization that has pervaded the academic literature and the mass media has persistently focused on some spaces, scales, and subjects, while excluding others. Typically,

> discourses of global capitalism continue to position women, minorities, the poor, and southern places in ways that constitute globalization as dominant. Images of passive women and places (frequently southern, but also deindustrialized places in the north) are constructed and simultaneously serve to construct discourses of globalization as capitalist,

as Western-centric, and as the only possible future for the "global economy." The result is "capitalist myopia," by which researchers assume that global capitalism is all encompassing and they cannot see, or consider salient, other non-capitalist, nonpublic spheres and actors. (Nagar, Lawson, McDowell, and Hanson, 2002: 262–263)

This second edition of *A World of Difference* seeks to respond to these erasures by starting with the excluded spaces, subjects, and scales of global capitalist development, before turning its attention to the dominant ones. At the same time, our analysis resists a compartmentalization between the local and the global on the one hand, and the dominant and subordinated places and actors on the other; we recognize these as always deeply intertwined and mutually constitutive. In our effort to do justice to both of these tasks, we have organized the chapters of this book into three sections. Part I provides a framework of multiple differences and how they become a part of the theories and practices of development; Part II considers social relations of difference and how they articulate with biophysical processes; and Part III addresses social relations of difference and how they articulate with large-scale global processes. Although the major themes of the first edition—society, nature, and development—are still at the core of our concerns, the present tripartite structure allows us to examine the relationships among culture, nature, development, and neoliberal globalization as contingent and constructed discursive practices and materialities, without privileging that which is already dominant.