CHAPTER 17

Remembering Historical Victimization

Potential for Intergroup Conflict Escalation and Conflict Reduction

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Past harms suffered by one's own group at the hands of another group are not simply chronicles found in a dusty history book. They are typically woven into the fabric of the group's identity, thus having consequences for intergroup attitudes and behavior (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). In this chapter, we address how both "good" (i.e., prosocial) and "evil" (i.e., antisocial) outcomes can flow from remembrance of historical victimization. We first consider the processes through which people can engage in harm doing toward members of other social groups—with little guilt or remorse—following reminders of their own group's historical victimization. Importantly, we discuss how negative attitudes and behaviors that stem from historical victimization are not merely directed toward members of the perpetrator group but also toward new groups not connected with the ingroup's victimization. We then examine the mechanisms that can lead to more benevolent outcomes when group members are reminded of their own historical victimization. Specifically, we discuss the necessary conditions for intergroup forgiveness and reconciliation, emphasizing

when collective apology will be effective and why all too often it is not. We also address how memories of ingroup victimization can lead victim group members to help other victimized groups who are suffering. The central role of the meaning derived from historical victimization—in terms of the rights or obligations for current conduct that it implies—and how outgroups are differentially categorized depending on the meaning derived are emphasized.

At this juncture it is important to note that we focus on the consequences of remembering historical victimization for members of the victimized group. In doing so, we are not suggesting that historical victimization reminders have no relevance for the attitudes and behavior of perpetrator group members (see Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012) or uninvolved third parties (see Warner & Branscombe, 2012). Instead, our objective is to examine how identifying as a member of a victimized group—and the ways in which outgroups are categorized and perceived—has implications for both prosocial and antisocial intergroup relations. Historical suffering is not neutral ground; suffering that stems from treatment that is perceived as unjust has implications for the social identity, morality, and emotions experienced by contemporary group members.

THE FUNCTION AND NATURE OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY

Members of a social group share a lineage. This is often expressed in terms of the group's "bloodline." The ancestral bridge, however, is not simply based on genetics. There is a bond that results from sharing a common history. Members of social groups have ancestors that have lived together, celebrated together, and—importantly—suffered together. Sharing these memories and formulating common beliefs about the sociopolitical context of those memories is a basic element of social identity formation.

According to Staub and Bar-Tal (2003), collective memories lurk below the surface, waiting to be brought to the fore. Particularly important, and having great impact, is the memory of ingroup suffering, even if all members (or oneself) did not experienced the suffering directly. For example, people who categorize themselves as members of a group experience vicarious empathy when informed of the suffering of a fellow group member (Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010; Davis, 1994). Memories of such events help formulate shared beliefs about the ingroup and its relationship to other social groups (Bar-Tal, 2000). Group members tend to internalize the victimization experienced in the past, transforming it into a cultural narrative that becomes a prism through which their current sociopolitical realities are filtered. For example, memories of the Holocaust among Jewish people tend to elevate the perceived threat of Palestinians to the ingroup's

continued existence, despite Israel's definitive military superiority (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). In this way, collective memories are functional; attitudes and behaviors as they relate to intergroup conflict in the present reflect memories of past experiences (see Connerton, 1989). Put another way, group members experience the present in the context of their shared lineage and perceived connection (or self-categorization) with that lineage.

Volkan (1997) argued that groups that are unable to shed the memories of their historical victimization are likely to perpetuate feelings of powerlessness among their members. Eventually, the group's identity can become focused on their historical victimization. The consequence might be sensitivity to revictimization and a willingness to act in antisocial or aggressive ways in the name of group defense (see Staub, 2006). Indeed, victimization (or even the threat of it) has been used as justification for engaging in behavior that inflicts harm on enemies. For example, the victimization that Americans experienced during the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon was used as justification for the invasion of Afghanistan, and the threat of Saddam Hussein possessing weapons of mass destruction was used as justification for the invasion of Iraq. Thus prior ingroup victimization can legitimize or provide a reason for harming other groups who were not perpetrators of the actual suffering sustained by the ingroup. With that said, history is replete with examples of intergroup forgiveness of past wrongdoing and reconciliation with the former perpetrators of ingroup harm. Indeed, as Tutu (1999) suggested, humanity could not survive without forgiveness—through which victimized group members use their victimization experiences as a platform to advance intergroup good. Having suffered victimization might even make some group members believe they are morally obligated to help members of other groups that are currently suffering. In this chapter, we first address the evil that can stem from remembering past victimization and then turn our attention to factors that help promote positive intergroup relations in the face of historical ingroup victimization.

PAST VICTIMIZATION AS A LICENSE FOR HARM DOING

Memories of past victimization serve a number of functions. First and foremost, memories of past victimization help situate one's group within an intergroup dynamic—a dynamic in which one's own group is cast as victim and the other group is cast as perpetrator. By this process, one's group is placed on the side of the good, whereas the perpetrator group is placed on the side of evil.

Perceiving one's own group as good and the perpetrator group as evil has important implications for group members' social identity. According

to Tajfel and Turner (1986), people are motivated to maintain a positive conception of the groups with which they identify. Morality is perhaps the most important dimension on which people evaluate their group (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). The victim role is attractive especially because victimhood enables a sense of moral superiority (see Moscovici & Perez, 2009). Specifically, following victimization, differences in the morality of one's own group and the perpetrator group become sharpened. The perpetrator group's goals and actions to achieve them are delegitimized. They are subsequently labeled cruel and uncaring—descriptors that paint the perpetrator group as less than human (see Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Leyens et al., 2000). Importantly, use of such descriptors increases the perceived likelihood that the perpetrator group is likely to revictimize if they have a chance.

The threat of revictimization heightens the perceived need for ingroup security, which can be addressed, in part, by acting against those who may pose a threat to the ingroup. Consequently, perceptions that a group has acted immorally toward one's own group can be used to justify behaving in an immoral fashion in response. Importantly, past victimization can also lead people to believe that other groups have ill intent toward one's own group (see Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992). Such a siege mentality justifies aggressive, harmful behavior as a preemptive, defensive strike. Thus, although moral principles are typically framed as yielding prosocial (i.e., "good") behavior (e.g., Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009), they can also be used as a tool to aggress against another group perceived to be evil.

Never Again: Immoral Behavior as a Defense against Future Victimization

Although it might be expected that people who themselves have a long history of suffering would "know better" than to harm others, the irony is that immoral behaviors can emerge from reminders of one's own historical victimization. The reason, according to Kelman (1992), is that groups that have recently experienced gross injustice are sensitive to the possibility that they might, once again, face a similar sort of threat that will require them to act to prevent new victimization. Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992) suggest that such sentiments are the central component of the siege mentality—a mental state in which members of a group hold the belief that the rest of the world has highly negative behavioral intentions toward them. Similarly, some people perceive the ingroup to be a perpetual victim—victimized by an array of enemies throughout its history (see Klar, Shori-Eyal, & Klar, 2013). Such appraisals of impending threat can arise from a history of group victimization and result in a desire to protect the group and its members. As Klar and colleagues (2013) make clear, among Israelis, the most frequently drawn lesson of the Holocaust is "never be a victim again," followed by "never

let members of your group be victims." Importantly, such lessons can be drawn without personal experience with the ingroup's historical victimization; mere self-categorization as a member of a historically victimized group is all that is required.

Coupled with the notion that the ingroup must be on guard against those who might seek to victimize its members once again, there is often a perceived moral right to preemptive attack in the name of self-defense. Put another way, what would otherwise be considered immoral behavior becomes justified when it is framed as a means to protect the ingroup from potential new victimization. Indeed, the necessity of "doing evil to do good" has been used as a prelude to war and intergroup conflict by tacticians from Machiavelli to Robert McNamara, the "architect" of the Vietnam War.

Wohl, Branscombe, and Reysen (2010) suggested that collective angst—a group-based emotion focused on the future vitality of the ingroup—is an emotional mechanism linking historical ingroup victimization to intergroup harm doing. Collective memories of victimization typically carry an aversive existential tone (e.g., "they tried to destroy us"). Such existential threat elicits collective angst (e.g., "I'm anxious others will want to destroy us as well"), which in turn motivates group members to engage in ingroup protective action (e.g., "we must act to protect our group's future"). Thus, although an antecedent of collective angst might be memories of past victimization, this aversive group-based emotion has implications for responses to contemporary adversaries (i.e., the expected source of future harm) and ingroup protective actions.

In support of this contention, Wohl and colleagues (2010) found that regardless of the nature of the extinction threat experienced—whether from physical, cultural, or symbolic threats to the group—collective angst led historically victimized group members to favor policies aimed at solidifying the boundaries between the ingroup and the outgroup. For example, collective angst was elicited when Jews were reminded of the Holocaust. Among other consequences, collective angst heightened their desire to pass along Jewish traditions and to marry only fellow Jews. Although the Holocaust did not occur within the lifetime of participants, due to social categorization as a Jew, Holocaust reminders heightened concern for the group's future vitality. Moreover, extinction threat and the collective angst it evokes lead to behavior aimed at creating greater ingroup cohesion, as well as a desire for separation from those categorized as outgroups.

More recently, Mols and Jetten (2014) claimed that collective angst helps frame harm doing toward an outgroup as a necessary means of preserving the vitality of the ingroup. By examining the discourse of populist right-wing party leaders in Europe, they found that these leaders purposefully feed collective angst by expressing concerns about losing collective roots. In doing so, they provide (potential) followers with a historical justification for harsher treatment of migrants and minorities. Specifically,

these leaders argue that group history shows that national survival depends on the group's ability to be strong in the face of threats. Providing further empirical support for this notion, Lucas, Rudolph, Zhdanova, Barkho, and Weidner (2014) found that heightened levels of collective angst predict support for exclusionary policies against immigrants. Thus, although direct experience with historical victimization may be absent, existential threat and memory of the victimization experienced by their ancestors can lead descendants to experience any new adversarial threat as reminiscent of that faced by their ancestors, and as a result they feel morally entitled to take action deemed necessary to reduce the threat (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992; Eidelson, & Eidelson, 2003).

Never Again: Laying Justification for Committing Evils

Reminders of past harms experienced by the ingroup can provide a license to engage in actions that harm others. Importantly, this license to harm others is not restricted to those who committed the historical harm. When the ingroup's historical victimization is salient, actions taken toward an entirely new enemy can be perceived as justifiable. We contend that historical victimization reminders undermine responsibility for harmful actions toward new enemies. In other words, historical victimization not only justifies the prospect of taking action against other social groups but also helps group members avoid feeling collective guilt that would otherwise be experienced when confronted by the harms they have committed against others.

Indeed, Wohl and Branscombe (2008) found that when Jewish North Americans were reminded of the Holocaust they felt less collective guilt for harm done to Palestinians, and this reaction was mediated by the increased illegitimacy of Palestinian actions and reductions in perceived Israeli responsibility for the conflict. However, when Jewish participants were reminded of another group's historical suffering (the Cambodian genocide) rather than their own group's Holocaust victimization, greater collective guilt for harm to Palestinians was experienced.

Because the existence of Israel today is rooted in the Holocaust experience (Teveth, 1996), perhaps the undermining of collective guilt depends on there being a link between the past victimization and current harmful actions toward Palestinians. To test whether this linkage between past victimization and present harm doing is necessary for collective guilt reduction, Wohl and Branscombe (2008) examined an instance in which such linkage was absent. The compelling case of American victimization by Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii in 1941 was utilized. There is little doubt that the Japanese bombing shattered Americans' sense of homeland security and served to bring the United States into the Second World War as a full combatant. Yet, because there is no connection between this instance of historical ingroup victimization and the war in Iraq, it was

possible to assess whether a perceived link between the past and present is necessary for such historical reminders to undermine feelings of collective guilt for current ingroup harm doing. When reminded of such ingroup past victimization (vs. another group's past suffering—the Nazi invasion of Poland), Americans reported less collective guilt for harm sustained by Iraqis, and this lessened guilt was mediated by a sense of lowered American responsibility for the harm and increased legitimization of American actions due to al Qaeda terrorism. These effects of historical victimization reminders were specific to ingroup members (Americans); Canadians who were reminded of American past victimization (vs. another group's) did not show reductions in perceived American responsibility or increased legitimization of American harm to Iraqis. Indeed, under these conditions, Canadians expected Americans to feel considerably higher levels of collective guilt for their harm to Iraqis than they did. Thus reminders of the ingroup's historical victimization can lessen collective guilt felt for harm committed against a new adversary group—even when the historical and current intergroup conflicts are entirely unrelated. Furthermore, it is not simply a cognitive or mere contrast effect producing these results. Not only was the effect specific to ingroup members and absent in outgroup allies, but reminders of grave historical suffering on the part of any other group failed to lessen the perceived severity of subsequent ingroup harmful actions. Rather, reminders of past victimization experienced by one's own group alone evokes a sense of entitlement to harm others who are currently perceived as a threat to the ingroup and lessens feelings of collective guilt for harm doing by reducing perceived ingroup responsibility and encouraging legitimization of ingroup actions.

Threat and Competition between Victimized Groups

The negative consequences of historical victimization reminders are not restricted to former, current, or possible future enemies. Reminders of the ingroup's historical victimization not only increase sensitivity to outgroup threats but also increase motivation to define the victimization experienced by one's own group as incomparable to any other and thus of great significance. The consequence is that reminders of past victimization can yield negative responses to another victimized group, even if they are not directly threatening one's own group (i.e., there is no risk of harm doing from the other victimized group).

The desire to label the victimization experienced by one's own group as being greater than the other group's is strongest when both groups are in conflict. In such contexts, both sides claim to have experienced the greater harm (Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012). The result is a reduced desire to find a solution to the conflict, which serves to continue the victimization of both sides (Noor et al., 2012; Sullivan et al., 2012). For example,

willingness to forgive and seek reconciliation for the Troubles in Northern Ireland decreased alongside an increase in competitive victimhood (Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi, & Lewis, 2008; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008). Importantly, the link between competitive victimhood and willingness to forgive was mediated by ingroup identification and outgroup trust such that higher identification and lower outgroup trust resulted in less willingness to forgive. Competitive victimhood also increases the perception that harm doing committed by the ingroup against an adversary was only in self-defense, and thus justified (Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, et al., 2008). Such justifications can be applied even when the suffering of the adversary group is made clear. For example, Jewish Canadians expressed entitlement to use any means necessary to defend the ingroup when reminded of Palestinian suffering—a desire that did not exist when Jewish Canadians were reminded of the suffering of neutral outgroups (Warner, Wohl, & Branscombe, 2014, Study 2).

Competition over victim status is not restricted to current adversaries; it can also exist among victimized groups that are not embroiled in conflict with each other (Noor et al., 2012; Sullivan et al., 2012). Although it would be reasonable to assume that victimized groups would recognize each other as compatriots in suffering, the existence of other victimized groups can pose a threat to the ingroup's victim role. As a result, one historically victimized group might respond negatively toward another historically victimized group. Indeed, Craig, DeHart, Richeson, and Fiedorowicz (2012) found that reminding white women of sexism (compared with a control condition) led to decreased pro-black responses. Additionally, to the extent that black Americans perceived their group to be victims of discrimination, more negative attitudes toward gay men and lesbians were expressed (Craig & Richeson, 2014, Study 1) and support for gay and lesbian civil rights was lowered (Craig & Richeson, 2014, Study 2). Craig and Richeson argued that reminders of ingroup victimization in these cases result in more negative intergroup attitudes because victimized group members are categorizing the other group as a competing identity outgroup. That is, when people self-categorize in terms of their racial group membership, sexual minorities are categorized as an outgroup. Instead of arousing empathy and increased common ground with the other victimized group, reminders of the ingroup's suffering serves as a social identity threat, resulting in increased ingroup bias and/or outgroup derogation. Presumably, it is difficult to see the commonalities in the suffering of the ingroup and the suffering of an outgroup when group membership is based on a different dimension or categorization. This can prevent a more inclusive victim recategorization and, potentially, increased reluctance to help another victim group in need.

Among victims, by construing all enemies (past and current) inclusively, reminders of past suffering can fuel current conflicts and lessen any

guilt for ingroup harm doing. Reminders of past suffering can also lead to the denial of suffering of enemies and even reduce sympathy for other victimized groups. However, "never be a victim again" is not the only possible meaning that past victimization can evoke. Members of victimized groups can, at times, draw the lesson of preventing the suffering of others from remembrance of their own group's victimization (Klar et al., 2013). As is illustrated in the following, when past suffering is drawn on as a motivation to prevent intergroup conflict and the ingroup is seen as not uniquely victimized, more prosocial responses toward others can be evoked.

HOW GOOD CAN EMERGE FROM REMINDERS OF PAST VICTIMIZATION

Evil abounds in intergroup conflict, and, as outlined in the previous section, the collective memory of evil done against one's group can be used to justify harming other groups (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). In other words, evil can be perpetrated in response to remembrances of prior ingroup suffering. Importantly, however, over the course of human history some historically victimized group members have exhibited a capacity to see good in their (former) foes and have taken on the duty of assisting other victims. Indeed, Americans fought a bloody war for independence from their colonial British rulers. Now America and Britain are the closest of allies on the world stage. France and Germany have fought many wars against each other over the centuries. They now stand as brothers-in-arms within the European Union. And Israel, the Jewish State, calls Germany one of its strongest supporters and trading partners only decades removed from the Holocaust (Müller, 2011). Likewise, many Jewish Americans were supportive of the black civil rights movement in the United States in the early 1960s (Greenberg, 2010). More recently, remembering their own group's internment in camps during the Second World War, Japanese Americans protested against negative portrayals of Muslims, who, as a group, were deemed untrustworthy following the September 11th terrorist attacks (Murray, 2008). The point is that there is the potential for positive intergroup relations toward both former enemies and other groups with a history of victimization.

When considering the victimized group's perspective, forgiveness is a crucial step in promoting positive intergroup relations between former enemies. Forgiveness involves abandoning retribution against one's enemies and sets the stage for reconciliation and future positive intergroup relations (Bar-Tal, 2011). Shared experiences of victimization may lead one victimized group to have more positive attitudes toward another victimized group through recategorization and meaning-making processes (Craig & Richeson, 2012; Galanis & Jones, 1986; Warner et al., 2014).

How Intergroup Forgiveness Can Undermine Conflict

Intergroup forgiveness is at the heart of the psychology of good in the face of intergroup evil. Yet intergroup forgiveness is not an easy outcome for victimized group members to achieve. Thus it is important to ask what allows victimized group members to abandon their right to resentment, indifferent behavior toward members of the perpetrator group, or retribution seeking. Failure to ask risks glossing over the ambivalence, if not outright disdain, that many victimized group members feel toward the perpetrator group in the aftermath of harm that even the most heartfelt gestures of reconciliation on the part of the perpetrator group may not penetrate. Furthermore, our discussion is grounded in the belief that intuitions about intergroup forgiveness, likely stemming from experience with interpersonal forgiveness, are insufficient in understanding the rocky road to intergroup reconciliation. Thus the antecedents and consequences of intergroup forgiveness require empirical scrutiny. Next, we review theory and research on how and why intergroup forgiveness is (or is not) granted.

What Is Intergroup Forgiveness and Why Is It So Hard to Grant?

Since the late 1990s, psychological research has made remarkable strides in delineating the antecedents and consequences of interpersonal forgiveness (see Riek & Mania, 2012, for a review)—a prosocial response by a victim to a transgression perpetrator (McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, 2000). When people are victimized there is typically an associated increased desire to avoid, or even seek revenge against, their transgressors. When forgiveness is granted, memories of the transgressor, as well as the transgression, no longer motivate the victim toward these behaviors. Additionally, the victim who forgives tends to reap rewards in terms of psychological and physiological well-being (see Larsen et al., 2012; Toussaint, Owen, & Cheadle, 2012). Thus it would appear that in forgiveness there is great potential for good.

Akin to interpersonal forgiveness, intergroup forgiveness has been commonly conceived of as a prosocial act that yields positive outcomes (e.g., Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). Indeed, similar to its interpersonal sister, Wohl and Branscombe (2005), as well as Cehajic, Brown, and Castano (2008), found that intergroup forgiveness of historical victimization reduces the desire for psychological, as well as physical, distance from members of the perpetrator group. Intergroup forgiveness has been shown to be a positive predictor of harmony-oriented attitudes and behaviors (e.g., the seeking of means to resolve intergroup differences in order to enable peaceful coexistence; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008). Given these outcomes, effort in uncovering avenues to facilitate intergroup forgiveness should be a good investment.

Wohl and Branscombe (2005) demonstrated that willingness to forgive a former perpetrator group is facilitated through a process of inclusive human categorization. Specifically, Jews were more forgiving of contemporary Germans for the Holocaust when they were induced to categorize members of both groups in terms of their common humanity. Likewise, Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, and Hagengimana (2005) demonstrated that Tutsi survivors who categorized the Hutu perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda as humans like themselves and who perceived such harm doing as pervasive across human groups expressed greater forgiveness and exhibited reduced trauma symptoms. Of course, it could be argued that perceiving the humanity in the direct perpetrators, or even the descendents of those who harmed fellow group members, is not an easy feat. After all, when common humanity is highlighted, the boundaries between groups weakens, which has been shown to be threatening (Jetten, Spears, Hogg, & Manstead, 2000). According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), group members are motivated to achieve and maintain a positive and distinct social identity. When intergroup distinctiveness is low, group members take action to reassert their uniqueness—action that can take on an antisocial or "evil" flavor (Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2006). Moreover, by placing perpetrators of intergroup harm into an inclusive, human category alongside one's own group, the value of that "human" category might be devalued. Such identity concerns may therefore undermine attempts at highlighting common humanity with the perpetrator group. Lastly, as Greenaway, Quinn, and Louis (2011) found, although common humanity increases forgiveness, it also reduces collective action to obtain restitution for the past harm experienced among historically victimized groups. Yet, once the common humanity wheels are set in motion, the resulting intergroup good appears to self-perpetuate. As shown by Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, and Doosje (2015), intergroup forgiveness results in perceiving an adversary group as trustworthy, like members of one's own group, which facilitates reconciliation.

Interestingly, perpetrator groups often seek to elicit intergroup forgiveness on the part of victim groups through the offer of a collective apology. Indeed, collective apologies have occurred with such frequency over the last few decades that Brooks (1999) has argued that humanity has entered an "age of apology." It is unknown precisely why there has been a recent upswing in the offer of collective apology, but the strong apology–forgiveness link that exists at the interpersonal level may well be part of the rationale (see Fehr, Gelfand, & Nag, 2010, for a meta-analytic review of the apology–forgiveness link). Despite the apologizer's presumably good intentions and desire to reconcile with the victimized group, the link between offering a collective apology and intergroup forgiveness on the part of victims is often absent (see Hornsey & Wohl, 2013 for a review).

In one of the first studies to assess the apology–forgiveness link at the

intergroup level, Philpot and Hornsey (2008) exposed Australians to historical transgressions (incidents from the Second World War) against their ingroup and manipulated whether or not the perpetrator group was said to have offered an apology. The hypothesized boost in intergroup forgiveness was not observed; this may have occurred because an apology induces forgiveness in victims only if it is perceived to be costly for the perpetrator and therefore sincere, or if the official representative delivering the apology is believed to have the support of his or her population. More recently, Shnabel, Halabi, and Siman Tov-Nachlieli (2015) showed that collective apologies are frequently perceived to be insincere—a result in line with the findings of Blatz, Schumann, and Ross (2009), who showed that Chinese Canadians tended to believe that an official apology provided by the Canadian government for historical harms committed against their community did not reflect sincere remorse and instead was seen as an attempt to win votes in the next election. Similarly, qualitative work suggests that victimized group members are often ambivalent about apologies. For example, Chapman (2007) analyzed 6 years' worth of transcripts from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and noted the rarity with which victims mentioned forgiveness. This seemed to be consistent with the rareness of sincere apologies offered by these direct perpetrators and with victims' awareness of the exchange made by the perpetrators of their truth-telling for avoidance of prosecution for their actions. In a different intergroup context, Philpot, Balvin, Mellor, and Bretherton (2013) found that although some indigenous Australians reported forgiving white Australians for the forced removal and relocation of their children to white Australians' homes (i.e., the Stolen Generation), no participant indicated that the collective apology issued by the Australian government a half-century later helped them through the forgiveness process.

One reason that efforts to facilitate prosocial intergroup relations in the aftermath of historical victimization tend to fall flat concerns the psychology of trust (Hornsey & Wohl, 2013). A lack of intergroup trust is a defining characteristic of groups in conflict, especially among highly identified group members (see Dovidio, Gaertner, Kawakami, & Hodson, 2002; Tanis & Postmes, 2005). Without trust, efforts by the perpetrator group are likely to be perceived as hollow at best and duplicitous at worst by members of the victimized group. Providing empirical support for this supposition, Nadler and Liviatan (2006) showed that trust moderated the effect of conciliatory statements by the Palestinian leadership on Israelis' willingness to forgive. Specifically, a conciliatory statement by the Palestinian leadership (compared with the no-conciliatory-statement control) promoted forgiveness among Israelis who reported high preexisting levels of trust in Palestinians. When preexisting trust was low (the typical state of affairs during intergroup conflict), a conciliatory statement appeared to undermine forgiveness (compared with the no-conciliatory-statement control).

Unfortunately, trust (in the service of intergroup forgiveness) is not easy to induce. Among other reasons, ingroup members tend to be skeptical about the motives, intentions, and character of outgroup members (see Tanis & Postmes, 2005). Thus, when the perpetrator group makes reparative moves, victimized group members are apt to concern themselves with possible ulterior motives (see Philpot & Hornsey, 2008). Complicating matters further, any attempt at repairing the wrongs of the past is typically offered by a representative of the perpetrator group. The consequence is that victimized group members question whether the offer was merely a political decision to pacify, whether all (or even most) of the perpetrator group agrees with the offer of repair, or whether most members of the perpetrator group even understand the suffering sustained by the victim group. In practice, formal intergroup apologies often do have a strong political and thus strategic component. Moreover, due to social identity protective processes, many members of the perpetrator group are reluctant to accept collective guilt for historical harms the ingroup committed (see Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). The outcome is, all too often, a lack of intergroup forgiveness on the part of historically victimized group members.

Creating the Psychological Infrastructure for Intergroup Forgiveness

According to the needs-based model of reconciliation (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009), victimization robs the group of its power and agency. Accordingly, perpetrators who restore the victimized group's power can facilitate the forgiveness process (see Wenzel & Okimoto, 2010). A collective apology is often presumed to rectify the power imbalance created by victimization, particularly if accompanied by an admission of guilt by the perpetrator (Tutu, 1999). Although a collective apology may not be an ideal vehicle for victimized-group empowerment, the act of granting forgiveness might have intrinsic power restoration qualities. In forgiving the perpetrator group, the victimized group demonstrates its moral fortitude—that it is strong enough to look beyond the harms inflicted. Advocating that victimized groups forgive the perpetrator group as a means of achieving reconciliation can place an undue burden on them. Nonetheless, actually granting intergroup forgiveness does encourage the belief that enduring peace between groups in conflict is possible and desirable (Noor et al., 2015). Likewise, intergroup forgiveness can increase willingness to have contact with former perpetrator group members (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005).

To help ensure that the victimized group feels empowered, it is important for both sides to come to a common understanding of the past. To this end, discussions between representatives of the victimized and perpetrator groups are often fruitful. At the foundation of any discussion should be validation of the suffering experienced by the victims, which perpetrator

groups are often tempted to downplay (Branscombe & Cronin, 2010; Wohl et al., 2006). Although it is challenging to their social identity and its moral image, perpetrator group members need to be empathetic witnesses to the suffering incurred by the victims. To the extent that perpetrator group members are able to do this, victim forgiveness is increased. Among victims who participated in the South African TRC and were given an opportunity to talk about the nature of the human rights violations they suffered, greater forgiveness of the perpetrators emerged (Kaminer, 2006). The use of these methods of reconciliation—through which victims convey their suffering at the hands of the perpetrator group—can be effective in unilateral intergroup conflicts, those in which the perpetrator and victim roles are clearly defined and recognized by the groups involved in the conflict (Klar & Schori-Eyal, 2015).

Acknowledging the harm done on both sides in bilateral conflicts, or conflicts in which both sides may be both victim and perpetrator, can also promote forgiveness. As discussed in the previous section, denying the suffering of the outgroup impedes reconciliation (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008). Making salient the suffering of both sides in an intergroup conflict, and thereby inducing a common victim identity, decreases defensiveness and increases intergroup forgiveness (Shnabel, Halabi, & Noor, 2013). Key to such conflicts with simultaneous claims on victimhood is the idea of mutual forgiveness—rather than one group apologizing and the other forgiving—as clear-cut perpetrator and victim roles are not accepted by group members. Klar and Schori-Eyal (2015) examined mutual forgiveness and willingness to apologize in Israeli residents living in a town bordering the Gaza Strip. They found that Israeli residents exhibited little support for Israel's apologizing for military actions in the Gaza Strip, and they accepted little moral responsibility for such actions in this bilateral ongoing conflict situation because they do not accept the sole-perpetrator role. However, Klar and Schori-Eyal (2015) found considerable support among Israeli Jews for mutual forgiveness—the idea that Israelis and Palestinians need to forgive each other in order to move toward reconciliation.

A secondary benefit of intergroup discussions about historical victimization is that it provides an opportunity for intergroup contact. Indeed, Hewstone and colleagues (2004) reported that contact between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland was positively associated with higher trust in the outgroup and with greater willingness to forgive its past misdeeds. Similarly, Cehajic et al. (2008) found that the contact between Bosnians and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina predicted Bosnians' willingness to forgive Serbs through enhanced perspective taking, trust, and perception of outgroup heterogeneity. Thus bringing together members of conflicting groups in a context that promotes both frequent and good quality contact may be central to achieving forgiveness (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

Intergroup contact can facilitate forgiveness in part because it provides opportunity to acquire new information about the perpetrator group. It

is easy for victimized group members to cognitively freeze on preexisting negative beliefs about a perpetrator group (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011) and be unwilling to incorporate new positive information about the adversary group (see Porat, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2015). Needed to change this pattern are ways to help the victimized group see that the perpetrator group is able to change (see Halperin, Russell, Trzesniewski, Gross, & Dweck, 2011). Providing evidence of the importance of perceived change in the perpetrator group, Licata, Klein, Saade, Azzi, and Branscombe (2012) showed that victimized group members who are able to differentiate those who committed the historical harm from contemporary outgroup members report increased levels of intergroup forgiveness. Broadly speaking, then, when victimized group members, such as Christians in Lebanon, can be focused on ways the perpetrator group (Muslims in Lebanon) has changed from how it was (or was perceived to be) during the past civil war, intergroup trust may be built, and this can result in greater forgiveness and conflict resolution.

How Past Victimization Can Increase Prosocial Responses to Other Victimized Groups

Reminders of past victimization do not only influence intergroup relations among victim and perpetrator groups. Such reminders can also affect the ways in which victimized group members react to the suffering of other groups. At times, belonging to a group with a victimization history can lead to more positive attitudes and prosocial intentions toward members of other stigmatized groups. Victims who recategorize other victimized groups at a more superordinate level (e.g., "we are all victims") exhibit more positive intergroup attitudes (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Reminders of victimization encourage this recategorization to the extent that they draw attention to similarities that members of different victimized groups share. Victimized group members may share a common experience of facing discrimination, disadvantage, stigma, or being subjected to violence (e.g., women and ethnic minorities). They may also share a common enemy or oppressor (e.g., African Americans, Mexican Americans, and Native Americans have all experienced harm at the hands of white Americans). When a common oppressor is perceived, different victimized groups may come to share similar goals—to reduce the disadvantages that their own and other stigmatized groups face.

To the extent that reminders of victimization increase perceived commonality between victimized groups, they can lead to more positive attitudes held by one victimized group toward another. For example, in one of the earliest social psychology experiments to examine the effects of reminders of victimization on judgments of members of a different victimized group, black undergraduates either read or did not read about a black individual who faced difficulties in life due to poverty and whose lawyer

said he "was a victim of society." They were then asked to evaluate a mentally ill individual. Black participants who were reminded of blacks' status as victims were more tolerant of the mentally ill person than black participants who were not reminded of blacks as victims (Galanis & Jones, 1986). Although Galanis and Jones did not measure any mediating processes, they speculated that reminders of one's own group's victimization promote the drawing of connections between one's own victimization history and the experience of other victimized groups. Such shared experiences were believed to create sympathy for members of a different victimized group and to lead to a more positive view of them.

More recent research has offered additional evidence that belonging to a victimized group can sometimes produce positive attitudes toward different victimized groups by increasing perceptions of similarity. For example, members of minority groups in the Netherlands desire less social distance from minority outgroups they see as more similar compared with those they see as less similar (Hindriks, Verkuyten, & Coenders, 2014). Among Latino Americans, perceiving discrimination as due to race is associated with being more likely to believe that Latinos share a common fate with black Americans (Craig & Richeson, 2012, Study 1b). When the salience of discrimination against Latino Americans was manipulated, Craig and Richeson (2012, Study 5) found that Latino Americans who were reminded of discrimination against their group had more positive attitudes toward black Americans compared with Latino Americans who had not been reminded of discrimination. This effect was mediated by perceived similarity between the two disadvantaged groups.

Remembering victimization can result in not only more positive attitudes toward other victimized groups but, in addition, a greater obligation or duty to help other, unrelated groups who have also been victimized. This is especially likely when members of victimized groups consider the meaning or lesson of that victimization for their own group. One meaning taken from historical victimization and oppression may be to try to prevent such atrocities from happening again or to provide assistance to victims if they do (Klar et al., 2013; Murray, 2008). This meaning may be most likely when parallels are drawn between the victimization that one group experienced and that of another. For example, some Jewish leaders have stated that Jewish people have a moral obligation to help the Sudanese refugees fleeing the genocide in Darfur due to their group's own Holocaust history (Messinger, 2005; Peraino, 2006; Wiesel, 2004). The perceived similarity between the victimization history of one's own group and the victimization of another group can enhance the sense of obligation to act prosocially toward the other group.

We examined these processes in a number of studies involving Jewish or female participants (Warner et al., 2014). First, we asked Jewish participants to consider the lessons of the Holocaust for either the victimized group (Jews) or the perpetrator group (Germans). Thus their ingroup's

victimization was always salient, but the meaning constructed was focused on one group or the other. We found that the Jewish participants perceived Jews as more obligated to provide assistance to other victimized groups and to do no harm to other victimized groups when they focused on the lessons of their group's victimization, for Jews compared with Germans (Warner et al., 2014, Study 1). Focusing on the meaning of victimization for one's own victimized group brought to mind a particular lesson—not letting others suffer as one's group has—and so highlights the experience of suffering that different victimized groups share. We replicated the lesson of the victimization focus effect with women by asking women to either consider the lessons of women's history of oppression for women or the lessons of it for men (Warner et al., 2014, Study 3). We then assessed how obligated women were to help blacks and to refrain from harming blacks, as well as how similar the oppression of women was to the oppression of other stigmatized groups. We found that perceived similarity of the groups mediated the effect of the lesson focus on moral obligation to help others and not do harm. Focusing on the lesson of women's oppression for women compared with men resulted in female participants perceiving their group's history of victimization as more similar to other oppressed groups' victimization, which in turn resulted in female participants perceiving women as incurring moral obligations to act prosocially toward blacks.

Experiencing collective victimization has long-lasting implications for members of victimized groups in how they think about and relate to members of other groups. The focus of experiencing collective victimization can shift from one of defensiveness and protection of the ingroup to one of avoiding continued intergroup conflict and suffering (Klar et al., 2013). Such a change in mind set can encourage intergroup forgiveness and assisting other victimized groups that are currently in need.

CONCLUSIONS

Reminders of one's own group's victimization can encourage "evil" and fuel harm doing toward not just the former perpetrator group (i.e., retribution) but, more critically, toward other, entirely new adversaries who were unconnected with the ingroup's original victimization. It is in this sense that reminders of past victimization can act as a license, or sense of entitlement, for current harm doing to others. The reason is that memories of one's own victimization can evoke a sense of perpetual ingroup threat (siege mentality) and elicit feelings of collective angst. Such angst leads victim groups to maintain separation from those categorized as outgroups. Threat and this "never again" understanding of intergroup relations lessens feelings of collective guilt for ingroup harm doing toward groups defined as "new enemies." Reminders of ingroup suffering, too, can have negative implications for responses to other victimized groups. When people

self-categorize as members of a uniquely victimized group, they show less sympathy toward other victim groups that are categorized as competing outgroups. However, when they recategorize those outgroups as sharing a common inclusive ingroup with their own (e.g., "fellow victims"), a moral obligation to help those others can emerge.

Intergroup forgiveness is another form of good that can emerge from historical victimization. This can entail forgiving the direct perpetrators of the harm done to the ingroup (e.g., Rwandan survivors of the genocide or black South Africans following the dismantling of apartheid), forgiving the descendants of the historical perpetrators (e.g., Jewish people forgiving contemporary Germans), or mutual forgiving of those one's group has both been harmed by and done harm to (e.g., Jewish Israelis and Palestinians in the current conflict). One of the most critical factors encouraging intergroup forgiveness in each of these forms is recategorization—perceiving the harm-perpetrating group as human like one's own. Intergroup apology by a representative of the historical or current perpetrator group is not so frequently effective at instigating intergroup forgiveness in members of the victimized group. The reason is that such apologies are rarely perceived as sincere or effective at restoring power to the victims, although they can be effective when seen as genuine. Apology can be effective when the outgroup representative is perceived to be trustworthy and is not seen as merely serving his or her own interests. Likewise, when the suffering of the outgroup is acknowledged, it can be taken as a sign of genuine desire for forgiveness and reconciliation.

Which process will operate in the face of reminders of historical victimization—licensing of harm doing toward others or empathy and mutual forgiveness—fundamentally depends on the interpretation given to the past. Is its meaning "never forget and always be on guard to protect ourselves," or is its meaning "we have to be on guard never to be perpetrators and not do what was done to us"? How others are categorized is also central to how outgroups are likely to be treated. If they are categorized as "human" like us, or victimized like us, then good may be more likely to emerge than evil when our own past suffering is recalled.

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